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PAY TO PLAY: LOOKING BEYOND DIRECT COMPENSATION 





Priding itself on the amateurism present in its sports, the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has long disallowed its athletes 
from making money from their athletic abilities while in school. This 
prohibition includes direct pay,1 pay for an athlete’s name, image, or 
likeness,2 a split in surplus,3 educational expenses in excess of those allowed 
by Bylaw 15,4 excessive expenses and awards,5 payments based on 
performance,6 preferential treatment,7 or prizes for participation in a 
school’s promotional activity.8 Most of these prohibitions are subject to 
certain exceptions, as provided in their respective rules. 
Several court decisions have supported the NCAA’s amateurism policy 
throughout the decades.9 The general public has also historically supported 
 
*   J.D. (2021), Washington University School of Law. 
1.   NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2019–2020 DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 12.1.2.1.1 
(2019) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL] While I use the Division I Manual throughout, the Bylaws are 
mostly consistent in the NCAA’s Division II and Division III Manuals. See generally NAT’L 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2019–2020 DIVISION II MANUAL (2019); NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC 
ASS’N, 2019–2020 DIVISION III MANUAL (2019). 
2.   While no specific rule forbids use of name, image, and likeness to generate revenue, 
various parts of Bylaw 12 make clear that such use is prohibited. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1 
arts.12.4.2.1(e) (forbidding use of an athlete’s name, picture, or appearance in advertisements for an 
employer), 12.4.1.1 (forbidding use of athletic reputation in determining compensation rate), 12.4.2.3 
(forbidding use to advertise athletic equipment), 12.5.1.1(g) (forbidding use for “commercial ventures”). 
3.   NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 12.1.2.1.2. 
4.   NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 12.1.2.1.3. 
5.   NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 12.1.2.1.4. 
6.   NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 12.1.2.1.5. 
7.   NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 12.1.2.1.6. 
8.   NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 12.1.2.1.7. 
9.   See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984) (“This 
decision is not based on . . . our respect for the NCAA's historic role in the preservation and 
encouragement of intercollegiate amateur athletics.”); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 197 n.18 

















the policy, with 71% of those polled in a 2013 Seton Hall survey saying that 
scholarships provided sufficient compensation for NCAA athletes.10 
However, that support has dwindled. A March 2019 Seton Hall survey 
found 49% of those polled support compensating NCAA athletes who 
participate in revenue-generating sports, versus 46% who said they did 
not.11 Meanwhile, a 2019 national survey from ScottRasmussen.com found 
that 52% of responders support paying those participating in revenue-
generating sports.12 As public support has increased, stakeholders in the 
decision have taken steps to further the desires of the general population. 
As the attitude towards the NCAA’s amateurism policy shifts, the 
policy needs to change with it. That change is coming—with or without the 
NCAA’s help. Several states have introduced legislation prohibiting the 
NCAA from punishing athletes who market their names, images, and 
likenesses, with California’s version passing in September 2019. 
Legislators have also begun planning federal change to collegiate name, 
image, and likeness rights. If the NCAA wants to control the situation, they 
need to act quickly and adequately, as inadequate action will result in 
disparate governmental action that results in uneven standards for collegiate 
athletes across the nation. 
Part I of this Note examines the history of the debate over NCAA athlete 
compensation and analyzes the potential constitutional challenge of the 
California law by the NCAA. Part II will discuss possible consequences of 
the California law and related bills in other states, and will examine 
potential alternative methods of compensation for NCAA athletes as well 
as potential practical effects of all considered alternatives. 
 
(1988) (The Court valued “. . . the NCAA's overriding function of fostering amateur athletics at the 
college level. . . . describ[ing] that function as ‘critical.’”); Bobby Chen, Antitrust Law and the Future 
of the NCAA’s Amateurism Rules, REG. REV. (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2019/02/21/chen-antitrust-future-ncaa-amateurism-rules/ 
[https://perma.cc/AN2N-JTZE] (“Federal antitrust law has historically okayed [amateurism rules].”). 
10.   Daniel Roberts, Poll: More People Than Ever Believe College Athletes Should be Paid, 
YAHOO FIN. (Mar. 24, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/poll-more-people-than-ever-believe-
college-athletes-should-be-paid-172810243.html [https://perma.cc/2D93-7ZWQ]. 
11.  Majority Feels Student Athletes Should be Compensated by Sneaker Companies for 
Wearing Their Brands: Less Support for Receiving Pay for Playing Revenue Producing Sports, SETON 
HALL U. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.shu.edu/sports-poll/upload/Did-Sneaker-Explosion-Hurt-Nike-
Brand.pdf [https://perma.cc/25G6-SHYK]. 
12.   Scott Rasmussen, 52% Believe Big Time College Athletes Should be Paid, 



















I. THE AMATEURISM POLICY: PAST AND PRESENT 
 
As the public’s view on collegiate amateurism has shifted, stakeholders 
have taken note and shifted, or tried to shift, the policy. This, for a short 
time, included the NCAA itself, which in October of 2011 authorized a 
$2,000 stipend, above tuition, room, board, books, and fees for Division I 
athletes.13 This stipend would be paid by the school the athlete attends.14 
However, amid challenges from member institutions about amateurism, 
budgets, and Title IX concerns, the NCAA delayed the stipend program 
until December of that year.15 The NCAA eventually expanded the stipend 
program to a range of $2,000 to $5,00016 to help cover the full, institution-
calculated cost-of-attendance.17 
Government actors have recently thrown their hats into the ring, with 
most action coming from California. In 2014, Judge Claudia Wilken of the 
Northern District of California, ruled that Division I football18 and men’s 
basketball players were entitled to make money from their names, images, 
and likenesses.19 While this decision was quickly overruled,20 it would 
prove to not be Judge Wilken’s last say on the matter, as she explained in a 
later decision that O’Bannon does not foreclose the possibility of other 
compensation methods, such as grant-in-aid awards.21 In 2019, Judge 
Wilken ruled again on the matter, saying schools were welcome to offer 
educational-related aides and accessories not included in NCAA’s cost-of-
 
13.   NCAA Shelves $2,000 Athlete Stipend, ESPN (Dec. 15, 2011), 
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7357868/ncaa-puts-2000-stipend-athletes-hold 
[https://perma.cc/KS9G-9YUU]. 
14.   Id. 
15.   Id. 
16.   Chris Isidore, College Athletes Finally Getting Some Cash, CNN (Sept. 4, 2015, 1:43 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2015/09/04/news/companies/extra-cash-college-athletes/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/2EK9-X4Z8]. 
17.   John Charles Bradbury & Joshua D. Pitts, Full Cost-of-Attendance Scholarships and 
College Choice: Evidence from NCAA Football, 19 YALE J. OF SPORTS ECON. 977, 978 (2018). 
18.   This ruling only applies to Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) member schools, not 
Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) schools, as the plaintiff class belonged to FBS member 
schools only. O’Bannon v. NCAA (O’Bannon I), 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2014) aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049, 1076 (9th Cir. 2015). FBS schools are the top level of Division I college 
football, competing in post-season bowl games. FCS schools are the lower-level Division I football 
programs, playing for eligibility in a post-season, bracketed tournament. 
19.   O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007–08. 
20.   O’Bannon v. NCAA (O’Bannon II), 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
21.   In re: National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 
14-MD-2541 CW, 2016 WL 4154855 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2016). 

















attendance calculation formula,22 but could not pay actual or effectual 
salaries to their athletes.23 
On September 30, 2019, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed 
the Fair Pay to Play Act.24 This law purports to prohibit California colleges 
and universities, even those that are NCAA members, from punishing 
college athletes who choose to make money from their names, images, or 
likenesses.25 Other States, including Florida, Colorado,26 and Nebraska,27 
have enacted their own versions of the law. Initially, the NCAA suggested 
it might challenge the California law on Commerce Clause grounds.28 
However, on October 29, 2019 the NCAA announced its board of governors 
“voted unanimously to permit students participating in athletics the 
opportunity to benefit from the use of their name, image and likeness in a 
manner consistent with the collegiate model.”29 While the NCAA does not 
define the “collegiate model,” the phrase seems to refer to the amateurism 
policy of the NCAA and the fact that collegiate athletes must be students of 
the university first, athletes second.30 
  
 
22.   These expenses include computers, science equipment, musical instruments, post-
eligibility scholarships, tutoring expenses, and study abroad opportunities. In re: Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2019), 
aff’d 958 F.3d 1239, cert. granted 2020 WL 7366281. 
23.   Id. at 1087. 
24.   Jack Kelly, Newly Passed California Fair Pay to Play Act Will Allow Student Athletes to 




25.   Fair Pay to Play Act, Cal. S.B. 206 § 2(a)(1), 2019–20 Leg. (Ca. 2019). 
26.   Justin Casey, Florida Says “Show Me the Money” Intercollegiate Athlete Name, Image 
and Likeness (NIL) Bill is Now Law, JD SUPRA (June 30, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/florida-says-show-me-the-money-85725/ [https://perma.cc/3823-
4NSG] (stating that Florida and Colorado have passed bills similar to the Fair Pay to Play Act). 
27.   Nebraska Fair Pay to Play Act, Legis. B. 962, 106th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2020). 
28.   Chris Bumbaca & Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Sends California Governor Letter Calling 
Name, Likeness Bill ‘Unconstitutional’, USA TODAY (Sept. 11, 2019, 10:51 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2019/09/11/ncaa-sends-letter-calling-california-likeness-
bill-unconstitutional/2284789001/ [https://perma.cc/B5G8-B47Q]. 
29.   Matt Brown, What the NCAA just said — and didn’t say — about players getting paid, 
SBNATION (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2019/10/30/20938975/ncaa-
players-likeness-payment-rights-announcement. 
30.   See Josephine R. Potuto et al., What’s in a Name? The Collegiate Mark, the Collegiate 


















A. The NCAA’s Introduction of Amateurism  
 
The amateurism debate is often focused around what may be one of the 
greatest marketing terms of modern time: “student-athlete.” The NCAA 
created this simple, yet brilliant term to help maintain its amateurism 
policy.31 However, deeper inside the term, is a much less pure meaning. 
While current conversations surrounding football focus on the violence 
of the sport, it used to be much more violent, causing several injuries and 
deaths at the collegiate level.32 Football was so violent that several colleges 
and universities discontinued it, and the public demanded abolishment or 
sweeping change to the sport.33 As public outcry grew, these complaints 
reached the Oval Office, prompting President Theodore Roosevelt to call 
college leaders to Washington, DC.34 In late 1905, New York University’s 
Chancellor gathered 13 colleges to make changes and, in late December 
1905, 62 colleges and universities chartered the Intercollegiate Athletic 
Association of the United States (the IAAUS).35 In 1910, the IAAUS 
changed its name to the National Collegiate Athletic Association.36 
The NCAA coined the term “student-athlete” in reaction to the 
Colorado Supreme Court’s ruling that an injured football player was an 
employee of the University of Denver and therefore entitled to workman’s 
compensation.37 According to then-NCAA Executive Director Walter 
Byers, a driving force behind the “student-athlete” terminology: “‘The 
student-athlete was a term used to try to offset these tendencies for state 
agencies or other governmental departments to consider a grant-in-aid 
holder’ to be an employee.”38 The term was created to justify denying 
paying college athletes for the work they perform. By design, it is meant to 
 
31.   Mary Grace Miller, Comment, The NCAA and the Student-Athlete: Reform is on the 
Horizon, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (2012). 
32.   History, NCAA (last updated Nov. 8, 2010), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110807060521/http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/abo
ut%2Bthe%2Bncaa/who%2Bwe%2Bare/about%2Bthe%2Bncaa%2Bhistory. 
33.   Id. 
34.   Id. 
35.   Id. 
36.   Id. 
37.   Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student Athlete: 
The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 83–84 (2006). 
38.   Jon Solomon, The History Behind the Debate Over Paying NCAA Athletes, ASPEN INST. 
(Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/history-behind-debate-paying-ncaa-athletes/ 
[https://perma.cc/AMW4-3URS]. 

















be open to interpretation, as the word student implies they are similar to 
students at play and the term athlete is meant to give leeway to their 
classroom performance.39 
The NCAA pushed hard for the “student-athlete” moniker and, with it, 
its policy of amateurism. Before long, the term and the idea of amateurism 
were plastered all over the NCAA’s rules.40 The Association began to fear 
having scholarship funds be deemed consideration for a playing contract.41 
In response to its fears, the NCAA began requiring specific amateurism 
language in acceptances of athletic scholarships.42 
However, the NCAA itself has moved away from its strict amateurism 
policy and is inching ever closer to selective amateurism. College athletes 
who are also Olympic participants are allowed to keep any Olympic awards 
from their nations while maintaining their amateur status.43 Tennis players 
may also accept prize money up to $10,000 per year prior to their collegiate 
career44 or up to “actual and necessary expenses” after enrolling full-time.45 
The NCAA’s amateurism policy also only extends to each sport 
individually.46 For example, if an athlete is a professional baseball player 
but wants to play NCAA football, the athlete may receive financial 




39.   Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/ 
[https://perma.cc/X8UD-GGC3]. 
40.   McCormick & McCormick, supra note 37, at 84. 
41.   See Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1963). 
42.   McCormick & McCormick, supra note 37, at 5 (citing WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES 
HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 75 (1995)). 
43.   NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 12.1.2.1.4.2, 12.1.2.1.4.3. 
44.   NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1 art. 12.1.2.4.2.1 
45.   NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1 art. 12.1.2.4.2.2. 
46.   NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1 art. 12.1.3. 
47.   See Garrison Lassiter, UNIV. OF MIAMI FOOTBALL (last visited Jan. 16, 2020), 
https://hurricanesports.com/sports/football/roster/garrison-lassiter/5181 [https://perma.cc/LGS2-XJ5K] 


















B. The Marble Court  
 
Throughout the years, the NCAA has received favorable rulings and 
decisions related— either directly or indirectly—to its amateurism policy. 
One of its most important victories came when it did not even know it was 
looking for one.48 But before these victories, the NCAA faced losses as 
courts found that NCAA athletes enjoyed certain employment benefits. 
 
1. College Athletes as Employees – The Nemeth and Van Horn 
Decisions 
 
The NCAA devised its “student-athlete” moniker in response to a 
Colorado Supreme Court decision.49 In University of Denver v. Nemeth50 a 
college football player, who also was employed to work around the tennis 
courts,51 sustained a back injury during a football game.52 Nemeth 
maintained he was also employed to play football, and with his injury 
arising from his employment activity, he was entitled to workmen’s 
compensation.53 The court found that, even if Nemeth was not employed to 
play football, his playing was a required part of his employment around the 
tennis courts, and because of that requirement, he was entitled to workmen’s 
compensation.54 
Despite the NCAA’s efforts to clearly establish that its athletes were 
students choosing to participate in intercollegiate sports and not employees 
while participating in their chosen sport(s) for workmen’s compensation 
purposes,55 another court disagreed. In Van Horn v. Industrial Accident 
Comm’n,56 Van Horn had stopped playing football but returned to the sport 
because he was offered a “pretty good deal to play football.”57 Van Horn 
 
48.   Despite the underlying case being an antitrust decision, NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of  Univ. 
of Okla. included language suggesting the amateurism policy was favored and would be upheld. 468 
U.S. 85, 120 (1984). 
49.   McCormick & McCormick, supra note 37, at 83–84. 
50.   127 Colo. 385 (1953). 
51.   Id. at 387. 
52.   Id. 
53.   Id. at 387–88. 
54.   Id. at 398–99. 
55.   See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 37, at 157. 
56.   33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). 
57.   Id. at 170. 

















would receive at minimum $50 for three of the four quarters of the school 
year as well as additional funds drawn out of an account marked for athletics 
throughout the school year.58 His scholarship also required him to be a 
“potential athlete” and be recommended by his coach to the scholarship 
committee.59 Those requirements effectively made playing football a 
requirement. Unfortunately, Van Horn died in a plane crash returning from 
a football game in Ohio.60 On these facts, the court found Van Horn to be 
an employee and therefore eligible for death benefits.61 
 
2. The Supreme Court Supports Amateurism in the College World 
 
The NCAA’s first win for amateurism came at a time they did not know 
they were looking for one. At the time where the television industry was 
exploding, the NCAA controlled television rights for all their conferences 
and member institutions.62 When the College Football Association (CFA) 
negotiated a television deal outside of the NCAA’s plan, the NCAA 
threatened sanctions on any member institution that chose to follow the 
CFA’s television deal, and in turn, violate the NCAA television plan.63 The 
NCAA further made it clear that despite violations relating specifically to 
these universities’ football programs, any sanctions imposed would not be 
so limited.64 All-in-all, Board of Regents is an antitrust case about television 
rights, but this did not stop Justice Stevens from discussing amateurism in 
the opinion. While dicta, Justice Stevens made sure to mention the Court’s 
“respect for the NCAA’s historic role in the preservation and 
encouragement of intercollegiate amateur athletics,”65 and that “[i]n order 
to preserve the character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be 
paid.”66 The NCAA touted these words for years,67 propping up what one 
 
58.   Id. at 171. 
59.   Id. 
60.   Id. at 170. 
61.   Id. at 175. 
62.   See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 90 (1984) (“During those 
years the NCAA continued to exercise complete control over the number of games that could be 
televised.”). 
63.   Id. at 94–95. 
64.   Id. at 95. 
65.   Id. at 100–01 (emphasis added). 
66.   Id. at 102. 
67.   See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 


















commentator has called an “Oz-like façade” of amateurism and control.68 
 
3. Judge Wilken’s Role in the Debate  
 
Judge Wilken of the Northern District of California has made quite a 
name for herself in the world of collegiate sports compensation. It started in 
O’Bannon I,69 a case brought in 2009. Edward O’Bannon and co-plaintiffs 
challenged the rules that disallow players from receiving a share of the 
revenues the NCAA and schools earn from licensing the players’ “names, 
images, and likenesses in videogames, live game telecasts, and other 
footage.”70 All plaintiffs involved played Division I men’s basketball or 
FBS football.71 In this antitrust case, Judge Wilken identified two distinct 
markets: the college education market and the group licensing market.72 The 
college education market is the market in which schools compete with each 
other to recruit the talent needed to fill a competitive roster.73 The group 
licensing market is a robust one for professional athletes, but college 
athletes have been unable to tap into it. In this market space, athletes are 
able to group up and sell licenses to their names, images, and likenesses for 
purposes such as game broadcasts and video games.74 
Specifically, Judge Wilken addressed three separate potential channels 
Division I football and men’s basketball players could pursue: (1) live game 
broadcasts; (2) video games; and (3) game re-broadcasts, advertisements, 
and other archival footage.75 Current contracts for broadcasting rights of live 
games already include name and image provisions, allowing broadcasters 
to utilize college athletes’ names, images, and likenesses (so long as they 
do not imply a commercial sponsorship).76 The NCAA’s own expert witness 
said that these rights create value for the NCAA and broadcasters, leading 
 
68.   Branch, supra note 39. 
69.   O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
70.   Id. at 963. 
71.   Id. at 965. 
72.   Id. 
73.   Id. at 966. From 2007 to 2011, nearly all of the top-level high school football recruits went 
on to play FBS football, with a small percentage of 4-star recruits choosing FCS. Id. For basketball 
recruits in the same time-frame, no 4-or-5-star recruits went to a non-Division I school and less than 1% 
of 2-and-3-star recruits went to a non-Division I school. Id. 
74.   Id. at 968. 
75.   Id. at 968–71. 
76.   See id. at 968–69. 

















Judge Wilken to conclude that athletes could also derive value if allowed to 
negotiate for themselves.77 
The judge also found reason to believe a value-driven market could 
exist for NCAA video games.78 A market had previously existed for EA-
published video games before the NCAA pulled its intellectual property 
rights, supporting Judge Wilken’s finding,79 as the NCAA Football games 
alone had been generating approximately $80 million per year in revenue 
before being discontinued in 2014.80 Similarly, Judge Wilken found value 
in re-broadcasting games and events, partially because of the names and 
images of the athletes of those games.81 Overall, Judge Wilken clearly found 
a market exists for the names, images, and likenesses of the top-level 
athletes in the most popular NCAA sports. However, the Ninth Circuit 
overruled the name, image, and likeness portion of the district court’s 
findings.82 For now, the issue of name, image, and likeness rights are at a 
judicial stand-still.83 
 
4. The NCAA’s Burden on Interstate Commerce  
 
In 1991, Nevada enacted a law which required any 40-state 
intercollegiate athletic association to provide certain procedural due process 
rights to any member institution and their associated individuals.84 The 
NCAA challenged the constitutionality of the statute, claiming it violated 
the Commerce and Contracts clauses of the United States Constitution.85 
The Ninth Circuit laid out a test for whether an accused state statute violates 
the Commerce Clause per se and therefore must be struck down. The test is 
whether the statute: “1) directly regulates interstate commerce; 2) 
 
77.   Id. at 969. 
78.   Id. at 970. 
79.   Id.; see also Steve Berkowitz, How EA Sports’s NCAA Football video game could make 
a comeback, USA TODAY (May 20, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2019/05/20/how-ea-
sportss-ncaa-football-video-game-could-make-comeback/3704876002/ [https://perma.cc/6QZT-
EDSF]. 
80.   Berkowitz, supra note 79.  
81.   O’Bannon I, F. Supp. 3d at 971. 
82.   O’Bannon v. NCAA (O’Bannon II), 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015). 
83.   Despite being about education-related benefits, a case being decided by the Supreme Court 
during the October 2020 Term could have implications on name, image, and likeness compensation. See 
NCAA v. Alston, No. 20-512 (U.S.). 
84.   NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 1993). 


















discriminates against interstate commerce; or 3) favors in-state economic 
interests over out-of-state interests.”86 The court found that the Nevada 
statute regulates interstate commerce directly because it only affects 
interstate collegiate athletic associations.87 Beyond the face of the statute, 
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the NCAA had long been held to affect 
interstate commerce by its very nature as an organization which markets and 
schedules events involving travel between states.88 
The Court also examined the practical effects of enforcement of the 
statute. Effectively, the NCAA would have two options: (1) enact a special 
set of rules for Nevada schools; or (2) use the rules prescribed by Nevada 
for all its member schools. The Court proclaimed that option one was a non-
starter and that, to accomplish its mission, the NCAA would have to utilize 
option two.89 As the Supreme Court has instructed, the critical inquiry is 
whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond 
the boundaries of the state.90 Nevada’s statute, the Ninth Circuit said, would 
force the NCAA to act outside of Nevada, going against this “critical 
inquiry.”91 The statute also violated the Commerce Clause because of a 
desire to protect “against inconsistent legislation arising from the projection 
of one state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State.”92 
Because several other states had enacted or were proposing similar laws, the 
risk of inconsistent obligations between states constituted a Commerce 
Clause violation.93 
It has become clear that the federal courts prefer keeping amateurism 
alive in the NCAA, albeit with some exceptions. Further, the Ninth Circuit 
has made it obvious that, within its Circuit, the NCAA is protected from 
individual state action by the Commerce Clause. With these factors 
combined, it seems that, barring a massive shift in Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, any changes to the amateurism policy would have to come 
from within the NCAA. 
  
 
86.   Id. 
87.   Id. 
88.   Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–02, 104 (1984)). 
89.   Miller, 10 F.3d at 638–39. 
90.   Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
91.   Miller, 10 F.3d at 639. 
92.   Id. (citing Healy, 491 U.S. at 336–37). 
93.   Id. at 639–40. 

















C. Modern State Attempts at Change  
 
Despite the Commerce Clause issues, states have still been attempting 
to force change themselves. The most notable of these came from California 
where, in February 2019, State Senator Nancy Skinner introduced the Fair 
Pay to Play Act.94 On September 9, 2019 the California Assembly 
overwhelmingly passed the bill 72-0.95 The California Senate soon 
followed, passing the bill 39-0 on September 11, 2019.96 Governor Newsom 
then completed the process, signing the bill on September 30.97 
The Fair Pay to Play Act98 contains several provisions, all relating to 
allowing specific college athletes to market their names, images, and 
likenesses. The class of athletes is broad, as it includes all college athletes 
that play for any non-community college team.99 The statute also prohibits 
punishment of athletes by their respective institutions, conferences, or over-
arching intercollegiate association if the athlete chooses to market and 
accept payment for their name, image, or likeness.100 It also prohibits 
punishments of schools for which those athletes play.101 The statute puts 
only a few specific limits on the marketability and earning capacity of the 
athletes. There are specific provisions for who may act as a student’s agent 
and legal representative.102 There is also a prohibition on a student 
marketing themselves with a competitor of a company the school is already 
associated with.103 The statute itself does not take effect until January 1, 
 
94.   Jason Scott, California Lawmaker Introduces ‘Fair Pay to Play Act’, ATHLETIC BUS. 
(Feb. 2019), https://www.athleticbusiness.com/college/california-lawmaker-introduces-fair-pay-to-
play-act.html [https://perma.cc/4SEP-6ACZ]. 
95.   Steve Berkowitz, California Assembly passes bill that brings state to verge of rules 
showdown with NCAA, USA TODAY (Sept. 9, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2019/09/09/california-assembly-bill-allows-college-athletes-
use-likeness/2269869001/ [https://perma.cc/HQH2-ETXG]. 
96.   Bumbaca & Berkowitz, supra note 28. 
97.   Dan Murphy, What California bill means for NCAA image and likeness debate, ESPN 
(Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/27585301/what-california-bill-means-
ncaa-image-likeness-debate [https://perma.cc/PLL6-SDNS]. 
98.   CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (West 2019). The Nebraska Fair Pay to Play Act contains 
provisions that provide largely the same substantive rights. Nebraska Fair Pay to Play Act, NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 48-3601, et seq. (2020). 
99.   EDUC. § 67456(a)(2); Fair Pay to Play Act, Cal. S.B. 206 § 1(c) (2019). 
100.  EDUC. § 67456(a)(2). 
101.  Id. § 67456(a)(3). 
102.  Id. § 67456(c)(2)–(3). 
103.  For example, it seems unlikely that a student could enter into a deal with Nike if their 


















2023104 to allow the NCAA time to come up with its full response.105 
Since the California bill’s introduction, several other states have 
introduced similar bills. A New York state senator proposed a bill in 
September 2020 which would not only give the same name, image, and 
likeness rights to college athletes, but also would require a 15% share of 
athletics revenues to be distributed to the athletes directly.106 Meanwhile, 
one South Carolina legislator pre-filed a bill in December 2020.107 The 
proposed law would add name, image, and likeness payments to the 
NCAA’s allowance for an hourly wage as well as an annual amount of 
$5,000 per sport played put in a trust to be disbursed after graduation.108 By 
January 2020, there were at least 35 states considering similar legislation.109 
Various federal legislators also hopped on the pile. In 2019, Republican 
Congressman Anthony Gonzalez from Ohio announced his intention to 
introduce a bill that would allow college athletes to make money from 
endorsements.110 Also in 2019, North Carolina Congressman Mark Walker 
introduced the Student-Athlete Equity Act, which would have amended the 
tax code, removing certain tax exemptions from the NCAA or any school if 
they did not allow name, image, and likeness payments to athletes.111 In 
2020, Marco Rubio introduced the “Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act.”112 
 
104.  Id. § 67456(h). 
105.  Murphy, supra note 97. 
106.  Dan Murphy, N.Y. senator proposes bill to pay college athletes, ESPN (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/27644345/ny-senator-proposes-bill-pay-college-
athletes [https://perma.cc/T4TZ-6TMP]. 
107.  Emily Bohatch, Should College Athletes Be Paid A Stipend? SC Bill Could Give Them Up 
To $25,000, THE STATE (Dec. 15, 2020 5:00 AM), https://www.thestate.com/news/politics-
government/article247837735.html. 
108.  Id. 
109.  Ross Dellenger, Iowa Becomes Latest State to Introduce Athlete NIL Bill; Targeting July 
1 Effective Date, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.si.com/college/2021/02/03/iowa-
name-image-likeness-bill-ncaa. 
110.  Dan Murphy, Congressman to Propose Federal Legislation for Paying College Athletes, 
ESPN (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/27751454/congressman-propose-
federal-legislation-paying-college-athletes [https://perma.cc/QYM3-NJQ3]. This bill attracted 
bipartisan support from Republican Florida Senator Marco Rubio Democratic Missouri Congressman 
Emanuel Cleaver. Joshua Nelson, Former NFL player-turned-congressman plans bill on college athletes 
making money, FOX NEWS (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/media/anthony-gonzalez-
college-athletes-paid-bill [https://perma.cc/6MFD-RDP9]. 
111.  See Jeremy Sheff, The Well-Intended But Misguided Student-Athlete Equity Act, 
HARVARD L. REV. BLOG (Sept. 11, 2019), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-well-intended-but-
misguided-student-athlete-equity-act/ [https://perma.cc/EHF4-UWN5]. 
112.  Marc Edelman, Marco Rubio’s Fairness In Collegiate Athletics Act Is Anything But What 
Its Name Implies, FORBES (June 22, 2020, 10:00 AM), 

















None of these bills made it far before the end of the session. 
Republican Senator Mitt Romney came out in support of a free market 
system for name, image, and likeness payments for college athletes.113 
Partnering with Connecticut Democrat Chris Murphy, the two formed a 
working group to discuss potential federal action.114 Murphy eventually 
introduced the College Athlete Economic Freedom Act in February 2021.115 
This Act goes further than the California law by not forbidding competing 
sponsorships. 
 
1. The NCAA’s Response 
 
The NCAA gave conflicting responses to the Fair Pay to Play Act’s 
movement through the California legislative process. Before Governor 
Newsom signed the bill, the NCAA sent a letter to his office claiming its 
passing “would result in [schools] being unable to compete in NCAA 
competitions” as well as saying that the law itself would be unconstitutional. 
Yet, on October 29, 2019, the NCAA governing board released a 
statement alluding to a potential change in policy. In the release, the NCAA 
said that its Board of Governors had “voted unanimously to permit students 
participating in athletics the opportunity to benefit from the use of their 
name, image and likeness in a manner consistent with the collegiate 
model.”116 Despite this seeming willingness to consider name, image, and 
likeness payments to its athletes, the NCAA has suggested it may still bring 




113.  Steven Silver & Hera S. Arsen, Is “Fair Pay to Play” Fair in College Sports? What 
California’s New Law Means for the Future of Amateur Athletics, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 9, 2019), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/fair-pay-to-play-fair-college-sports-what-california-s-new-law-
means-future-amateur?amp [https://perma.cc/93WN-M32E]. 
114.  Thomas Barrabi, NCAA athlete pay debate: Why a political showdown is coming in 2020, 
FOX BUSINESS (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/sports/ncaa-athlete-pay-debate-2020-
expert-predictions [https://perma.cc/RL8Z-5SV6]. 
115.  Murphy, Trahan Introduce Legislation To Allow College Athletes To Make Money Off 
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the NCAA had originally planned to vote on name, image, and likeness 
reform in January 2021, it delayed the vote indefinitely, citing external 
factors.118 
The NCAA also used troubling language in its announcement about 
name, image, and likeness rights. Such wording included: “[p]rotect the 
recruiting environment and prohibit inducements to select, remain at, or 
transfer to a specific institution” and “[m]aintain the priorities of education 
and the collegiate experience to provide opportunities for student-athlete 
success.”119 The quote about recruiting effects could suggest the NCAA will 
not adopt a policy which may affect recruiting. Similarly, the NCAA may 
claim that allowing such payments would necessarily interfere with 
athletes’ education as they focus on brand deals more than their studies. 
However, given the care and attention college athletes already must give to 
their sport, and to an extent ensuring they do not violate the current 
amateurism rules, any extra time and work, likely done by an agent and not 
the player themselves, is likely to have little true effect on an athlete’s 
classroom performance. 
These sticking points on the constitutionality of the state laws and the 
NCAA’s own wording in its press release suggest that the Association may 
still be planning on limiting the amount or method of compensation a 




118.  Dan Murphy & Adam Rittenburg, NCAA Delays Vote to Change College Athlete 
Compensation Rules, ESPN (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.espn.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/30694073/sources-ncaa-delays-vote-change-college-athlete-compensation-rules 
[https://perma.cc/8UJW-M9C6]. External factors likely include antitrust concerns arising from a DOJ 
letter, id., and a pending US Supreme Court case, Brief for Respondents at 11, NCAA v. Alston, Nos. 
20-512, 20-520 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2020). 
119.  Board of Governors Starts Process to Enhance Name, Image and Likeness Opportunities, 
NCAA (Oct. 29, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-governors-
starts-process-enhance-name-image-and-likeness-opportunities [https://perma.cc/2SWA-5EGN] 
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE ACTIONS AND THE 
ROUTES THE NCAA COULD – AND SHOULD – RUN  
 
Despite the NCAA’s policy shift, slight as it may prove to be, 
California’s law is still on the books and no other states nor the federal 
government have suggested they will be halting their own efforts. As 
explained in Part I.C.i, supra, the NCAA has also suggested it may still 
challenge individual state laws. Because of the nature of the NCAA in 
relation to the Commerce Clause, the Association may be successful in any 
state statute challenge. However, the Commerce Clause may not protect the 
NCAA from federal action. The constitutionality of the laws, proposed and 
enacted, will be discussed in subpart A. 
Beyond the potential effects of existing and new laws, a question about 
what the NCAA should do with allowances of name, image, and likeness 
payments arises. The California Fair Pay to Play Act has a delayed effective 
date, allowing the NCAA to develop its strategy. In the NCAA’s October 
2019 announcement about considering allowing name, image, and likeness 
payments, the Association gave its three divisions a January 2021 deadline 
to craft the rules they plan on using for name, image, and likeness 
payments.120 The NCAA formed a working group until April 2020 whose 
mission was to gather feedback regarding how it should act.121 Alternatives 
for integration of name, image, and likeness payments into the collegiate 
model and my recommendation will be discussed in subpart B. 
The choice of how to act goes beyond just a decision of allowing name, 
image, and likeness payments to college athletes into the method used to 
compensate (should that decision be made) and the practical effects of 
allowing any payments. While these practical effects will be discussed 
throughout subpart B, a large bulk of the discussion, specifically 
surrounding my preferred alternative, will be discussed in subpart C. 
  
 
120.  Process to Enhance NIL, supra note 119. 
121.  Process to Enhance NIL, supra note 119. If the NCAA reads this Note, please consider it 


















A. The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Name, Image, and 
Likeness Laws  
 
The dormant Commerce Clause is a doctrine stating that only the United 
States Congress has authority to regulate interstate commerce.122 While the 
Constitution does not specifically mention a “dormant Commerce Clause,” 
it has long been a part of the understanding of Article I § 8 cl. 3.123 In 1970, 
the Supreme Court established a balancing test to determine the validity of 
state action on interstate commerce.124 Specifically, the dormant Commerce 
Clause applies “when a state law directly affects transactions that take place 
across state lines or entirely outside of the state’s borders.”125 However the 
mere potential of a state law to control actions wholly outside the state’s 
borders gives rise to a dormant Commerce Clause violation.126 
The test for the dormant Commerce Clause begins with a question. Does 
the state statute: (1) regulate or discriminate against interstate commerce or 
is its effect to favor in-state economic interests; or (2) merely indirectly 
affect interstate commerce, despite an evenhanded state law?127 If a state 
statute satisfies option one of the Brown-Forman question, then it violates 
the Commerce Clause per se and must be stricken down.128 If the state 
statute satisfies option two, the Pike balancing test is used.129 
  
 
122.  Commerce Clause, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/commerce_clause [https://perma.cc/UV5F-RVWX]. 
123.  See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 71 (1824) (“[P]ower [to regulate commerce] can 
never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant.”). 
124.  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
125.  Daniels Sharpsmart, Inc. v. Smith, 889 F.3d 608, 614 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting S.D. Myers, 
Inc. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 253 F.3d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
126.  NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1993) (saying the potential for a Nevada law 
to affect commerce in other states is a violation). 
127.  See Healy v. Beer Inst. Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 337 n.14 (1989) (quoting Brown-Forman 
Distillers Corp. v. N.ew Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)). 
128.  Miller, 10 F.3d at 639–40. 
129.  Id. at 638. 

















1. Most of the Fair Pay to Play Act Violates the Dormant Commerce 
Clause Per Se  
 
The Ninth Circuit has made it clear that state regulation of a nationally 
uniform business is unconstitutional.130 It has also made clear that the 
NCAA, by its very nature, is a nationally uniform business.131 California, 
being in the Ninth Circuit, will be subject to this precedent if the NCAA 
chooses to challenge its law. The Ninth Circuit is not alone in considering 
the NCAA an interstate actor—the Fifth Circuit and United States Supreme 
Court have both come to the same conclusion.132 
The Fair Pay to Play Act has eight sub-sections. Sub-section (a) allows 
name, image, and likeness payments and prevents punishment.133 Sub-
section (b) prohibits a school from directly paying an athlete for the 
student’s name, image, and likeness.134 Sub-section (c) allows athletes to 
retain the services of an agent.135 Sub-section (d) makes clear that 
scholarships are not name, image, and likeness payments and that receiving 
said payments cannot lead to revocation of an athlete’s scholarship.136 Sub-
section (e) prohibits collegiate athletes from entering into contracts with 
competitors of official school sponsors.137 Sub-section (f) prohibits a school 
from preventing collegiate athletes’ marketing of their own names, images, 
and likenesses via a team contract.138 Sub-section (g) defines what schools 
are covered by the Fair Pay to Play Act.139 Finally, sub-section (h) delays 
the effectiveness of the Act until January 1, 2023.140 
Of those sub-sections, (a)(2), (a)(3), (b), and (c) all make specific 
mention of a “group or organization with authority over intercollegiate 
 
130.  See Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 950 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
131.  Miller, 10 F.3d at 639. 
132.  Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1150 (5th Cir. 1977); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102, 104 (1984) (finding that the NCAA was engaged in interstate commerce 
and thus subject to federal antitrust law). 
133.  CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456(a) (West 2019). 
134.  Id. § 67456(b). 
135.  Id. § 67456(c). 
136.  Id. § 67456(d). 
137.  Id. § 67456(e). 
138.  Id. § 67456(f). 
139.  Id. § 67456(g). 


















athletics.”141 Sub-section (a)(2) makes it clear that this phrase is meant to 
apply to the NCAA by adding “including, but not limited to, the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association” to the end of the general line.142 By making 
rules which intercollegiate athletic authorities—including the NCAA—
must follow, California is attempting to regulate an interstate actor and 
interstate commerce. This attempted regulation makes the California law 
unconstitutional under Ninth Circuit precedent.143 
Sub-section (a)(1) violates this same rule. While it does not specifically 
mention the NCAA or an organization with authority over intercollegiate 
athletics, it does prohibit any California college from enforcing rules that 
prevent its athletes from earning name, image, and likeness 
compensation.144 The rules for which enforcement is prevented would be 
promulgated by either the NCAA or NAIA145 which require uniformity 
throughout the country. Therefore, with (a)(1) affecting a rule which needs 
to be uniform throughout the United States for it to be given proper effect, 
it would also satisfy option one of the Brown-Forman question, leading to 
it being unconstitutional. 
Similarly, sub-section (d) affects the rules set forth by the NCAA. 
College athletes are deemed ineligible for play if they receive money for 
their name, image, or likeness.146 Additionally, the NCAA specifically 
forbids the use of agents by college athletes.147 Because the athlete, when 
ineligible, is no longer a “student-athlete,” the athlete also loses their 
athletic scholarship.148 Sub-section (d) prevents nationally uniform 
 
141.  Id. § 67456(a)(2)–(c)(1). 
142.  Id. § 67456(a)(2). 
143.  NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1993); c.f. Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et 
d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 950 (9th Cir. 2013). 
144.  EDUC. § 67456(a)(1). 
145.  The NAIA (National Association for Intercollegiate Athletics) is a governing body similar 
to the NCAA but composed primarily of smaller schools. While it would also be regulated by the 
California law, the NAIA is clearly not the focus of the Act. 
146.  See supra text accompanying note 2. “An individual loses amateur status and thus shall 
not be eligible for intercollegiate competition in a particular sport if the individual: (a) Uses his or her 
athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport; (b) Accepts a promise of pay even 
if such pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate athletics participation” NCAA 
MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 12.1.2(a), (b). 
147.  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 12.3. 
148.  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1 art. 15.3.1.1; see also Eric Boehm, A College Football 
Player Lost His Scholarship Because of YouTube Videos. Now He's Fighting Back., REASON (Dec. 2, 
2017, 9:20 AM), https://reason.com/2017/12/02/a-college-football-player-lost-his-schol/ 
[https://perma.cc/49SR-GB6Y] (describing how a college football player lost his scholarship for making 

















enforcement of the NCAA’s rules, making it unconstitutional. 
While sub-sections (e) through (h) do not violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause per se, they would still be stricken for other reasons. 
Namely, the remaining provisions, now holding no weight without the 
provisions allowing for name, image, and likeness payments without 
punishment, would be inseparable from the already stricken provisions. 
Therefore, with no provision being unobjectionable, the entire statute would 
have to be stricken if the NCAA challenges the law.149 
 
2. California’s Potential Rebuttals  
 
California may try to distinguish its statute from the Nevada law in 
question in NCAA v. Miller by stating that the Nevada law regulated the 
NCAA’s ability to punish coaches and players while the Fair Pay to Play 
Act pertains only to actions between athletes and the third parties that would 
pay them.150 However, this argument is likely miss the net. The California 
law clearly affects the NCAA’s ability to punish the athletes and member 
schools. The law has provisions which prevent punishment of athletes and 
schools.151 For this argument, California has no leg to stand on. 
The state may also mount a counter-attack by drawing comparison to 
other Commerce Clause cases which provide more antitrust protections than 
federal law does.152 Specifically, Professor Chris Sagers points to 
Association des Eleveurs de Canards et D’oies du Quebec v. Harris, a Ninth 
Circuit case in which the court decided that regulation of production in-state 
does not affect production in other states. 153 However, despite Sager’s 
claim, the fight over name, image, and likeness still fits more in-line with 
Miller because of the unique status given to the NCAA in comparison to 
 
monetized YouTube videos). 
149.  NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1993). 
150.  Michael McCann, What's Next After California Signs Game Changer Fair Pay to Play 
Act Into Law?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/09/30/fair-
pay-to-play-act-law-ncaa-california-pac-12 [https://perma.cc/VLY8-3DS8]. 
151.  See, e.g., EDUC. §67456(a). 
152.  Chris Sagers, Letter to Gavin Newsom in Reply to the NCAA: Constitutionality of 
California SB 206, the “Fair Pay to Play Act,” CLEVELAND-MARSHALL C. OF L., CLEVELAND ST. U. 5 
(Sept. 27, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3460551 
[https://perma.cc/9AUS-GAFJ] (a letter written upon request of the sponsoring California state senator 
to Governor Newsom). 


















other private businesses and regulators. 
California could also attempt to move its law out of a per se violation 
and into the Pike balancing framework. Getting out of the per se violation 
will be a high hurdle for California, as the statute specifically mentions the 
NCAA.154 The state could argue that the law does not target the NCAA, but 
merely mentions it by way of example. In doing so, it would be trying to 
argue that the law does not regulate or discriminate against interstate 
commerce because the law itself only applies to California institutions. 
Further, if given time, California could try to argue that the law does not 
favor in-state economic interests. It would do so by showing that no recruits 
were swayed by the prospects of selling their name, image, or likeness while 
playing for a California school. This would, most likely, be a near-
impossible showing unless some sort of national rule allows for the same 
name, image, and likeness payments the Fair Pay to Play Act does, which 
would make the entire argument moot. 
If California is able to avoid a per se violation and use the Pike 
balancing test, it could have an interesting argument. In 1981 the Supreme 
Court, analyzing under the Pike balancing test, declared an Iowa law 
unconstitutional for violating the Commerce Clause.155 The Iowa law 
generally prohibited the use of 65-foot trucks in the state.156 In finding that 
Iowa’s law substantially burdened interstate commerce, the Court took issue 
with the law being “out of step with the laws of all other Midwestern and 
Western States.”157  
If other states, preferably all states, follow California’s lead and pass 
similar laws, using the Pike balancing test, California may be able to argue 
that by being in step with other states, there is no burden on interstate 
commerce. Even with few other states enacting similar laws, California may 
have an argument to make. The Court likely chose to use the “Midwestern 
and Western” designations because the statute in question regulated 
something inherently geographic—driving and interstate travel. The 
question in a challenge to the Fair Pay to Play Act is less geographic in 
nature, instead having more to do with where potential recruits go. If states 
with colleges that already attract athletic recruits pass a law substantially 
 
154.  EDUC. § 67456(a)(2). 
155.  Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 678–79 (1981). 
156.  Id. at 665. 
157.  Id. at 671. 

















similar, or identical to, the California law, California could argue there is no 
substantial burden on interstate commerce. This same argument would also 
help to rebut the Ninth Circuit’s concern in NCAA v. Miller regarding the 
risk of inconsistent obligations between states.158 The Kassel theory is 
seemingly untested, and the Miller argument may require identical laws to 
be passed in the states. 
Overall, even with California’s best argument, it would be relying on 
an untested theory that would require rebutting a strong presumption of a 
law affecting the regulations of the NCAA being a per se violation of the 
Commerce Clause. Miller would certainly control. 
 
3. Nebraska’s Law May Produce a Different Result  
 
The Eighth Circuit has not heard a dormant Commerce Clause case in 
which the NCAA is a party. Instead, to examine Nebraska’s law, the general 
dormant Commerce Clause test must be used. Like the Ninth Circuit, the 
Eighth Circuit uses a two-tier test.159 Because the Nebraska law only applies 
to schools within its borders, it does not facially discriminate against 
interstate commerce. Therefore, the analysis moves to whether the law 
discriminates on its effect or purpose. In IESI, an out-of-state corporation 
claimed Arkansas had no legitimate purpose in enacting a regulation.160 The 
corporation pointed to a negative comment about the out-of-state company 
from a District board member.161 However, the District was able to point to 
a “wholly legitimate interest” of regulating waste in-and-out of the state.162 
The Eighth Circuit has said a regulation on intrastate transmission of 
electricity did not violate the Commerce Clause in part because states, not 
a federal agency, retain authority over location and construction of electric 
lines. 163 The right of publicity flows from the states, not the federal 
government.164 Analogizing to LSP Transmission, a pathway to validating 
 
158.  NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 639–40 (9th Cir. 1993). 
159.  IESI AR Corp. v. Nw. Ark. Reg’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 433 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 
2006). 
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. The board member expressed the opinion that IESI was “a big company from out of 
state.” Id. 
162.  Id. at 604–05. 
163.  LSP Transmission Holdings, LLC v. Sieben, 954 F.3d 1018, 1031 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing 
Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 773 (7th Cir. 2013)). 


















the Nebraska Fair Pay to Play Act shows itself—states retain authority over 
name, image, and likeness rights, thus making this a legitimate state 
interest.165 The Eight Circuit also seems hesitant to use the Pike balancing 
test to invalidate a state law in general, noting that the Supreme Court has 
rarely done so.166 Of course, with existing Ninth Circuit precedent in its 
favor, the NCAA will almost certainly ask the Eighth Circuit to adopt the 
Ninth Circuit’s understanding of the NCAA’s role in interstate commerce 
as a de facto regulator. The NCAA may be facing a circuit split. 
 
B. The NCAA Should Support Its Athletes 
 
While the NCAA may not have to follow the California law, it should 
still take action to support its athletes. While athletics scholarships certainly 
help those who receive them, not every college athlete gets an athletic 
scholarship. As of March 2018, only 59% of Division I athletes and 62% of 
Division II athletes received some form of athletic scholarship.167 While 
Division III athletes are not eligible for athletic scholarships, 80% of those 
athletes received some form of scholarship.168 Of the Division I and II 
athletes receiving athletic scholarships, likely only a small percentage were 
for the full cost of attendance.169 This is because the NCAA limits the 
number of scholarships each school can give out. For Division I, these rules 
are set forth in bylaw 15.5.170 However, in general, there are fewer 
scholarships available than members of the team.171 
Athletes still must pay for tuition, books, fees, dinner with friends, 
going out, and every other expense of college. While the NCAA technically 
permits athletes to have a job, that job may be realistically unobtainable. 
 
to Control Your Identity Online, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTEL. PROP. L. 811, 819 (2011). 
165.  The Eighth Circuit made this ruling based on a regulation which would uphold the status 
quo. LSP Transmission, 954 F.3d at 1031. Here, the court would be reversing the status quo. 
166.  Id. (quoting S. Union Co. v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 289 F.3d 503, 508 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
167.  NCAA Recruiting Facts, NCAA, 
https://collegiatewaterpolo.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/NCAARecruiting-Fact-Sheet-
WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/93UA-LF3M]. 
168.  Id. 
169.  Athletic Scholarships: Everything You Need to Know, NCSA, 
https://www.ncsasports.org/recruiting/how-to-get-recruited/scholarship-facts#. 
170.  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 15.5.1.10.1. 
171.  For example, Division I baseball is limited to 11.7 total scholarships to be divided among 
an average of 36 players. Baseball 2020, SCHOLARSHIP STATS.COM, 
http://scholarshipstats.com/baseball.html [https://perma.cc/29HT-RLKN]. 

















Athletes are not permitted to use their name, image, and likeness in 
connection with any outside employment.172 Further, many athletes are 
already spending 30–50 hours per week working on their sport, despite the 
NCAA’s claim that athletes are limited to 20 hours per week.173 With that 
amount of time spent devoted just to their sport, plus any time devoted to 
academics, getting a job is an unrealistic possibility for many college 
athletes. 
But some “athletes” already affiliated with universities on a varsity 
level are already permitted to earn compensation for their names, images, 
and likenesses—gamers. Varsity collegiate e-sports started in 2014 at 
Robert Morris University in Illinois with a League of Legends team.174 
Since then, at least 100 other schools have started programs.175 
These e-athletes are not governed by the NCAA.176 Therefore, there is 
nothing preventing these varsity athletes from making money from their 
names, images, and likenesses. In fact, collegiate League of Legends player 
Julien177 has a Twitch page, on which advertisements run and he solicits 
donations. In contrast, if an NCAA athlete attempted to monetize videos of 
their sport, it would result in a sanction.178 If the NCAA truly wants to 
“[a]ssure student-athletes are treated similarly to non-athlete students”179 it 
would have to say that playing a sport sanctioned by them is compensation 
comparable to what they would earn otherwise or, preferably, should start 
treating their athletes like other collegiate athletes. 
  
 
172.  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, art. 12.4–12.5. 
173.  Andrew Zimbalist, The NCAA Sports Model Is Broken, And It’s Time For Congress To 
Step In, FORBES (Dec. 20, 2019, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewzimbalist/2019/12/20/the-ncaa-sports-model-is-broken-and-its-
time-for-congress-to-step-in/#4888baeb3d09 [https://perma.cc/GS5H-FJS8]. 
174.  Sean Morrison, List of varsity esports programs spans North America, ESPN 
https://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/21152905/college-esports-list-varsity-esports-programs-
north-america [https://perma.cc/KA6M-7TUE]. 
175.  Id. 
176.  Twitter Direct Message from David Kirk, Esports Program Dir., Illinois State Univ. to 
author (Jan. 25, 2020) (on file with author). 
177.  Julien, GAMEPEDIA, https://lol.gamepedia.com/Julien [https://perma.cc/EUL6-YBAB]. 
178.  See Inside the NCAA (@InsidetheNCAA), TWITTER (July 31, 2017, 3:40 PM), 
https://twitter.com/InsidetheNCAA/status/892122868355657728. 


















1. The NCAA Has Options  
 
The NCAA needs to act now by allowing its athletes, who help the 
Association generate revenue in the ballpark of one billion dollars,180 to 
make money off of themselves.181 The NCAA has several options to help 
accomplish this goal ranging from severely stunted name, image, and 
likeness rights to allowing full-blown salary payments. There are a wide 
array of options just within the name, image, and likeness sphere of 
possibility. Each option follows a basic checklist of items: (1) receive 
payment now or deferred payment; (2) individual or collective payment; 
and (3) individual or collective bargaining.182 
 
a. Let the NCAA Rule  
 
The most restrictive option is to have the NCAA itself negotiate name, 
image, and likeness rights on behalf of all its athletes for, example, a video 
game. The money received would then be put into a separately earmarked 
account and distributed equally to each athlete at such a time where all 
athletes for that year are no longer eligible for NCAA competition. In this 
case, the NCAA would effectively be acting as the athletes’ agent. Further, 
because the money is deferred and controlled by the NCAA, the athletes 
would all still essentially be amateurs. By keeping the athletes “amateurs,” 
this plan would fall into the “collegiate model” the NCAA hopes to maintain 
 
180.  Steve Cameron, The NCAA brings in $1 billion a year—here's why it refuses to pay its 
college athletes, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2019, 9:14 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ncaa-
college-athletes-march-madness-basketball-football-sports-not-paid-2019-3 [https://perma.cc/YPY4-
TPGC]. 
181.  This need has only been intensified by the COVID-19 pandemic, as various conferences 
canceled or postponed their 2020 football seasons, the 2020 NCAA basketball tournament was canceled, 
and spring 2020 sports were barely started or not played at all, potentially affecting athletes’ draft 
prospects and professional earning potentials. See Adam Epstein, Coronavirus is forcing the biggest 
global sports shutdown since World War II, QUARTZ (Mar. 11, 2020), 
https://qz.com/1816538/coronavirus-is-shutting-down-sports-from-soccer-to-ncaa-basketball/ 
[https://perma.cc/F2XE-Y56N]. 
182.  Collective bargaining for college athletes is a separate topic too wide for the scope of this 
Note. Northwestern Football players have tried in the past to unionize, but were ultimately denied. 
Northwestern Football Union Timeline, ESPN (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.espn.com/college-
football/story/_/id/13456482/northwestern-football-union-line [https://perma.cc/3J5R-HCKF]. Name, 
image, and likeness rights for college athletes may re-open the path, whether it be through a union or 
trade association. See generally Maureen A. Weston, Gamechanger: NCAA Student-Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litigation And The Future Of College Sports, 3 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 77, 108 (2014). 

















in whatever plan it announces by 2021.183 This option also has a certain level 
of financial benefit to the athletes. Because the NCAA would be pooling 
that money together, they could put it in investment vehicles, increasing the 
amount of payout. 
However, this plan is not without issues. First and foremost, this option 
would equalize every athlete. Each athlete would not make money off 
themselves, but off the strength of the NCAA as a brand. Therefore, it is a 
near certainty that a player like Joe Burrow184 would receive less money 
than if he got to negotiate on his own while someone like Toby Clark185 
would likely make much more than if he were to negotiate on his own. Due 
to the deferment, this option also fails to help college athletes financially 
while they’re still in college. Additionally, the NCAA may not be as 
inclined to fully maximize value in any deal it negotiates, cutting into the 
amount an athlete would receive. 
While this restrictive option certainly has its benefits, the drawback of 
not allowing athletes to capture their own respective values and not allowing 
athletes to use the money they generate while still in school outweigh the 
benefits. To get to a better solution, the means will need to be less restrictive. 
 
b. Division by Division  
 
There are a few options to lessen restrictions. One way is to get more 
specific with who the payments will go to, and therefore the value the 
payments will be based off. For example, instead of negotiating for the 
whole NCAA, each division could separately negotiate. Assuming the same 
deferment and all-athlete restrictions apply, this would only slightly alter 
the situation for the top Division I players, as their received value would be 
diminished by players at smaller Division I schools who would likely not 
receive the same amount on their own. Greater change would be felt by 
Division II and III athletes, as their values would not be inflated by the brand 
 
183.  Process to Enhance NIL, supra note 119. 
184.  Joe Burrow was the starting quarterback for the 2020 FBS National Champion Louisiana 
State University football team. Joe Burrow, LSU SPORTS, https://lsusports.net/sports/football/roster/joe-
burrow/20215 [https://perma.cc/G4PJ-Q932]. 
185.  Toby Clark was a freshman football player at Washington University in St. Louis who 




















values of the top Division I programs. 
This option would help maintain true value. This helps maintain another 
aspect of the NCAA’s stated mission in looking into allowing for name, 
image, and likeness payments. In its press release, the NCAA said any 
change should “[a]ssure student-athletes are treated similarly to non-athlete 
students unless a compelling reason exists to differentiate.”186 The average 
student with a market for their name, image, and likeness (for example, a 
member of the band) is likely to have a smaller, less valuable market at a 
Division II or III school compared to one at a Division I school purely 
because of the value of the school name.187 
 
c. Let the Conferences, Schools, or Teams Decide  
 
Getting more specific, instead of having an NCAA body negotiate, each 
conference could negotiate for its players. This plan would get closer to the 
true value derived from athletes. Every conference is different, and 
generates different levels of revenue due, mostly, to athletic prestige of the 
member schools. For example, the Southeastern Conference (SEC), home 
of athletic powerhouses like Alabama, Louisiana State, and Kentucky, 
generates around $660 million each year in revenue.188 Meanwhile, the 
Missouri Valley Conference (MVC), home of Loyola-Chicago and North 
Dakota State,189 brings in around $11 million per year.190 Athletes in the 
 
186.  Process to Enhance NIL, supra note 119. 
187.  See Potuto, et al., supra note 30, at 971 (suggesting that part of an athlete’s derived value 
comes from the institution they play for). At times, of course, a particular player can break that trend. 
For example, Jacob Tucker, a Division III athlete, won the 2011 Dunk Contest at the NCAA Division I 
Final Four, creating a much larger potential name, image, and likeness market for him compared to most 
other Division III basketball players. Brian Floyd, Jacob Tucker, Of Illinois College, Wins 2011 NCAA 
Dunk Contest At Final Four, SBNATION (Apr. 1, 2011, 9:15 AM), https://www.sbnation.com/2011-
ncaa-tournament/2011/4/1/2084207/jacob-tucker-2011-ncaa-dunk-contest-video-final-four-illinois-
college [https://perma.cc/GY6K-QPV2]. 
188.  Steve Berkowitz, The SEC has record revenue in 2018, but Big Ten schools rake in more 
per-school distribution, USA TODAY (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2019/02/01/sec-passed-big-ten-per-school-distribution-
after-record-revenue/2743885002/ [https://perma.cc/48MX-ZG3B]. 
189.  North Dakota State University is a member of the MVC for football only. MO. VALLEY 
FOOTBALL CONF., https://valley-football.org [https://perma.cc/X7PU-3SB8]. 
190.  Jay Rigdon, Loyola’s Final Four run means years of increased revenue for Missouri 
Valley Conference members, AWFUL ANNOUNCING (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://awfulannouncing.com/ncaa/loyolas-final-four-run-means-years-of-increased-revenue-for-
missouri-valley-conference-members.html [https://perma.cc/B2FP-JAB6]. 

















SEC are typically better recruits191 and better professional prospects192 than 
those in the MVC. The greater historic prestige also leads to larger probable 
markets for players’ names, images, and likenesses at schools that play in 
the SEC (or other large, historically successful conferences). 
This option would be largely similar to having the NCAA negotiate 
deals but would better capture value of each athlete because it is more tied 
to the value they produce. Further, with fewer schools, and therefore 
athletes, to spread the payout to, each athlete’s value would be better 
captured since it would not be affected by athletes in different conferences. 
An even more specific version of this is letting the schools themselves 
decide. In fact, the California law may implicitly cause just this. Because 
athletes’ personal deals cannot violate their school’s sponsorship deals,193 it 
is entirely possible for a school to simply negotiate away the athletes’ ability 
to negotiate for themselves by making every imaginable partnership 
themselves.194 Then, athletes could only talk to the school’s official 
sponsors, cutting their market to one source and limiting potential earnings. 
This option would also help keep school spirit and unity intact, as all athletes 
would receive the same amount of money. It would also align with the 
NCAA’s stated goal of “[e]nhanc[ing] principles of diversity, inclusion[,] 
and gender equity.”195 Just because your chosen sport may not be as popular 
as others would not mean you make less. However, a complication may 
arise when athletes who drive revenue to the school earn the same amount 
 
191.  SEC Commitments – 2019, ESPN http://www.espn.com/college-
sports/football/recruiting/conference/_/class/2019/id/8 [https://perma.cc/QA9S-P7FQ] (showing the 
grades, and number of, football recruits at SEC schools); Missouri Valley Commitments – 2019, ESPN, 
http://www.espn.com/college-sports/football/recruiting/conference/_/class/2019/id/21 
[https://perma.cc/T2XP-D777]. 
192.  Spencer Parlier, Colleges most represented on 2019 NFL rosters, NCAA (Jan. 1, 2020), 
https://www.ncaa.com/news/football/article/2019-09-03/colleges-most-represented-2019-nfl-rosters 
[https://perma.cc/24CR-VGN4]; 28 From Valley Schools on NFL Rosters, MO. VALLEY FOOTBALL 
CONF., https://valley-football.org/news/2018/9/2/football-28-from-valley-schools-on-nfl-rosters.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/5KAM-5HWS]. 
193.  CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456(e) (West 2019). 
194.   I have greater concern over just this possibility in the wake of Michigan State’s 
men’s basketball team being presented by Rocket Mortgage. Greta Anderson, Michigan State Men’s 






















as those who do not come close to the same revenue levels.196 
More specific yet, each individual sports team could negotiate as a unit. 
This option would allow players that may contribute from a less prominent 
position, like an offensive lineman, to reap the reward for some of the 
benefit he provides his quarterback and running back derive by blocking for 
them. This plan would also help keep team unity up while earning more 
money, as all players would receive the same amount and could inspire the 
whole team to perform better to help with negotiations for the next year. 
The options discussed above have gotten increasingly individualized, 
each better capturing an individual athlete’s value than the one before. 
However, there still is a better option which best captures individual value. 
 
d. Athletes Should Make Their Own Decisions 
 
The best way to guarantee athlete value is fully captured would be to 
allow each individual athlete to negotiate their own name, image, and 
likeness deals. Even assuming a deferred payment system, the athlete would 
be able to collect the money quicker (but still not during their time as an 
NCAA athlete). However, at this point especially, the “collegiate model” 
seems to be thrown by the wayside. At the same time, this option gets 
college athletes closer to being able to do what every other student at their 
school can do—sell their own name, image, and likeness however and 
whenever they want. 
This purely-athlete system is not without its issues. Athletes could sign 
with competitors of their school’s official partner, leading to smaller 
markets for school-company partnerships and generating less revenue for 
schools’ athletics programs to put towards scholarships for athletes. Beyond 
that, negotiating and performing these deals may take more time away from 
athletes. Eventually, the athletes will have to decide how to split time 
between their health, their sport, their studies, and their money-making 
method. Likely, health and school will be the ones to suffer. 
This option still does not help athletes afford to live during college. For 
that, the financial deferment needs to be eliminated. While doing this would 
 
196.  For example, at FBS schools the average football team generates more revenue than the 
next 25 sports combined. Cork Gaines, The average college football team makes more money than the 
next 25 college sports combined, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 20, 2016, 11:08 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/college-sports-revenue-2016-10 [https://perma.cc/6V7M-2EMA]. 

















move college athletes further from amateurism, it would help ensure they 
are treated more like their non-athlete peers. It gives athletes more power 
over themselves, and for those elite athletes that are more likely to go to 
their respective professional league, it could help them develop their 
budgeting skills and money-consciousness before being given thousands or 
millions as soon as they step off campus. 
But none of that happened. Instead, in a bitterly ironic turn, Kent State 
corresponds almost perfectly with the Supreme Court’s lurch away from its 
formative First Amendment ideals and toward a new, utterly different set of 
priorities that would come to define First Amendment law’s second half 
century. 
 
2. What the NCAA Should Do  
 
The NCAA has several options beyond those laid out above. And the 
best one, for the NCAA, its member institutions, and athletes, is to adopt 
the Calirfornia Fair Pay to Play Act as the official NCAA rule. The 
California law does a great job of allowing each athlete to fully capture their 
own independent value by allowing them to negotiate for themselves. 
Without a deferred payment provision, the Act also allows all athletes, 
regardless of whether they have a full scholarship, the opportunity to lessen 
their debt burden and better enjoy their time in college. However, by its sub-
section (e) prohibitions, the California law also removes the competing-
sponsors problem seen in Part II.B.i.d, supra. Full adoption of the California 



















C. Potential Practical Effects of Adoption of the Fair Pay to Play Act  
 
Fully adopting the Fair Pay to Play Act would have real-world effects 
beyond allowing athletes to make money off themselves. And while some 
of these effects likely have no effect on its adoption, others may be 
stumbling blocks. 
 
1. Will It Play in Peoria? 
 
One such effect would be a likely change in the way college athletics 
recruiting occurs. Notably, this is an effect the NCAA wants to avoid.197 
This section’s title was chosen for a reason. The titular saying is about the 
mid-size city Peoria, Illinois. Peoria is not home to a lot, but it does house 
MVC member Bradley University and Fortune 100 company Caterpillar.198 
It is certainly not hard to imagine Caterpillar, given the opportunity, wanting 
to help its hometown university recruit better talent. And a potential 
partnership with athletes is not hard to imagine: “Just like our trucks, Darrell 
Brown199 doesn’t stop.”200 
The underlying feeling holds true for other teams. For example, 
Bradley’s MVC peer and nearby neighbor, Illinois State University is in 
Normal, Illinois. Normal’s twin city, Bloomington, Illinois, is home to two 
large insurance providers, Country Financial and State Farm. State Farm is 
no stranger to sports-related advertising, as they already have commercials 
with NFL star Aaron Rodgers and NBA star Chris Paul.201 At a school where 
the business school building’s name is the “State Farm Hall of Business,”202 
 
197.  Process to Enhance NIL, supra note 119.  
198.  While Caterpillar’s executives left Peoria in 2018, Caterpillar still considers Peoria 
“home.” Steve Tarter, Caterpillar's Move Left Behind 12,000 Workers, DAILY HERALD (Oct. 27, 2018, 
7:43 AM), https://www.dailyherald.com/news/20181027/caterpillars-move-left-behind-12000-workers 
[https://perma.cc/PE2P-U8XY]. 
199.  Darrell Brown was a starting guard for the Bradley Braves’ basketball team, leading the 
team in minutes. 2019-20 Men's Basketball Cumulative Statistics, BRADLEY UNIV. 
https://bradleybraves.com/sports/mens-basketball/stats [https://perma.cc/7EQS-52X4]. 
200.  I apologize for a terrible marketing campaign. I am a law student, not a sports marketing 
expert. 
201.  State Farm Insurance, Rodgers Rate (:30) | State Farm® Commercial, YOUTUBE (Sept. 
10, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dt9rfHBmTuw [https://perma.cc/WAK3-BC3B]; Merritt 
Productions, Deer State Farm® Commercial featuring Chris Paul and Oscar Nuñez, YOUTUBE (Feb. 5, 
2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yiYGxlr74mw [https://perma.cc/44MJ-R8VA]. 
202.  State Farm Hall of Business, ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSE (last visited Apr. 4, 2021), 

















it is not unimaginable that State Farm would want to help its local school 
recruit better talent if the NCAA allowed it. 
State Farm could help by pre-approving talent for a potentially lucrative 
sponsorship deal that would allow players to appear in commercials with 
the aforementioned sports stars. It is hard to imagine that an 18-year-old 
recruit would not jump at the chance to be able to meet a legend in the sport 
they play or even are just a fan of. This idea is applicable outside of central 
Illinois as well. Any college in a larger metropolitan area or a smaller metro 
area with a large corporate presence could see similar benefits due to the 
newly existent college athlete name, image, and likeness market in the local 
market. 
However, the plan likely will not have a huge effect on recruiting. 
College sports are largely a self-feeding loop. The schools that are already 
athletic powerhouses get the best recruits and therefore have the best chance 
of competing in the near future. Recruits want to compete soon as well, so 
they choose to go to an already impressive program. Couple near-
guaranteed success with incredible facilities203 and better professional 
prospects204 and you start to see the top-recruit cycle develop. Any real 
change in the current recruiting landscape will be slow and systematic, not 




203.  Bud Elliott, How teams like Alabama convince 5-star recruits to commit and sit on the 
bench, SBNATION (Jan. 15, 2016, 9:39 AM), https://www.sbnation.com/college-football-
recruiting/2016/1/15/10774592/alabama-recruiting-playing-time-elite-star-signing-day 
[https://perma.cc/WV8X-TSAF]. 


















2. It’s in the Game  
 
The EA-published NCAA football games were massively popular when 
they were still being sold as late as 2014.205 Production of the video game 
stopped in 2013 with fears of legal issues surrounding potentially 
unauthorized use of college athletes names, images, and likenesses 
surfacing.206 As evidenced by social media users throughout the process of 
the passing of the Fair Pay to Play Act, fans miss the football game and want 
it back.207 
In January 2021, EA announced it would be returning to the college 
game.208 While it partnered with Collegiate Licensing Company to ensure 
access to FBS school names, traditions, uniforms and playbooks, EA plans 
to forego use of player names, images, and likenesses.209 EA plans to 
monitor the the name, image, and likeness “discussion,” but any eventual 
decision will not impact the game’s release.210 Multiple schools, including 
powerhouse Notre Dame, announced they will not be part of the video game 
until rules surrounding name, image, and likeness are settled.211 While the 
video game may not directly impact the NCAA, having top programs like 
Notre Dame not be part of the game could hurt the NCAA’s image. 
  
 
205.  See Bryan Lawver, NCAA Football’s Return has Overwhelming Player Support on 
Twitter, SCREEN RANT (July 21, 2020), https://screenrant.com/ncaa-football-return-overwhelming-
player-support-electronic-arts/ [https://perma.cc/J7N6-9BGH]. 
206.  Id. 
207.  See, e.g., Kėv (@KJS407), TWITTER (July, 9, 2019, 11:26 AM), 
https://twitter.com/KJS407/status/1148629633300144128 [https://perma.cc/GE59-AV3Q] (a fan asking 
EA to bring back the series); Barstool Sports (@barstoolsports), TWITTER (Oct. 29, 2019, 2:16 PM), 
https://twitter.com/barstoolsports/status/1189259770013933568?s=20 (reacting to news the video game 
is coming back). 
208.  Michael Rothstein, EA Sports to Do College Football Video Game, ESPN (Feb. 2, 2021), 
https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/30821045/school-plan-ea-sports-do-college-football 
[https://perma.cc/F5BN-B7FS]. 
209.  Id. 
210.  Id. 
211.  Zach Koons, Another School Is Pulling Out Of EA Sports’ College Football Game, COLL. 
SPUN (Feb. 28, 2021), https://thespun.com/aac/tulane/tulane-pulls-out-of-ea-sports-college-football-
game-citing-nil-debate [https://perma.cc/LQX6-U49W].  

















III. THE LAST OUT 
 
It is time for college sports to modernize. The NCAA has an opportunity 
in front of them to improve their public relations by making a change 
themselves before every state forms a patch-work regulatory framework. If 
that were to happen, the NCAA would have to sue in every state to 
invalidate the laws. Even if every state does not act, the NCAA may want 
to act before the federal government does, because a federal action would 
not be subject to Commerce Clause invalidation. 
The NCAA needs to adopt a fully modern proposal now, one that serves 
the interests of the athletes that need it and that helps the schools maintain 
a level of control. The Fair Pay to Play Act does just that. Adopting the Act 
into its own rules, before a government actor forces them to, would allow 
the NCAA to gain control and some much-needed good news in light of 
recent suspensions for similar payments. 
Adoption of the Act may also help increase parity, allowing more fans 
to experience the joys of winning, keeping them as fans for life. It may also 
keep some otherwise-bubble professional prospects in the college system, 
keeping star power up in the NCAA, increasing fan experience and 
retention. It would also give people a piece of their childhood back in the 
form of the NCAA football video games. 
This Note is written to encourage the NCAA to adopt the Fair Pay to 
Play Act. It has gone in depth into the reasons the NCAA adopted an 
amateurism policy, why it has persisted, and why the policy is eroding. It 
has examined current efforts by states, particularly California, to do away 
with the policy and the unconstitutionality of those state-level efforts. In the 
wake of the state efforts, the NCAA swiftly announced that it was 
considering a change and would be allowing, somehow, name, image, and 
likeness payments to college athletes. But it did not clarify how it would 
institute this new policy. Several options are present, and one stands out 
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